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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a contentious dispute between the City of Middleton, Idaho, and 
various entities involved in the development of West Highlands Subdivision ("Project") in the 
Middleton community. The Appellants are those entities involved in the Project's development: 
Coleman Homes, LLC, the builder ("Coleman Homes"); West Highlands, LLC, the developer 
("West Highlands"); West Highlands Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc., the 
homeowner's association ("West Highlands HOA"); and West Highlands Land Development, 
LLC, the landholding company for the Project ("WH Land"). 
This lawsuit arose from Middleton seeking to exact open space without properly 
compensating the Project, and a disagreement regarding how much land the West Highlands 
HOA must identify as public park space to Middleton under a Parks Dedication Agreement 
("PDA''). The parties also disputed whether West Highlands and Coleman Homes would pay 
impact fees under an Impact Fee Agreement ("IF A"). These agreements prohibit Middleton from 
collecting impact fees from West Highlands and Coleman Homes in exchange for West 
Highlands HOA keeping a certain amount of park space open for the Middleton public. 
Middleton, at the behest of Mayor Darin Taylor, sought to have it both ways, suing to 
enforce his contorted interpretation of the agreements, while also collecting impact fees. After 
West Highlands and Coleman Homes threatened a breach of contract counterclaim against 
Middleton for these illegally-collected fees, Middleton folded and returned $23,760.00-
representing the amount of the illegally-collected impact fees. 
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Litigation ensued regarding how much space the West Highlands HOA must keep open 
for the public under the PDA. Middleton and West Highlands HOA agreed that the PDA was 
enforceable-the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment litigated only the issue of how 
much land must be dedicated as public space. Ultimately, the district court decided that West 
Highlands HOA must dedicate 12.8 acres of public park space to Middleton-an amount falling 
between that advocated by each side. The district court additionally awarded Middleton its fees 
and costs under LC.§ 12-120(3), and declined to award any to any of the Appellants. 
The instant appeal asks this Court to vacate the district court award of attorney fees and 
costs to Middleton and remand to the district court with instructions to declare Appellants the 
prevailing party for the following reasons: (1) the district court erroneously failed to consider 
that the Appellants secured the return of illegally-collected impact fees from Middleton; (2) the 
district court failed to consider that the Appellants agreed that the parties' agreements were 
enforceable early on in the case; (3) the district court failed to distinguish among the several 
defendant-appellants involved in the action for the purposes of the award; (4) Middleton's 
memorandum of fees and costs was not timely filed or served; and (5) based on these erroneous 
conclusions, the district court abused its discretion in determining that Middleton was the overall 
prevailing party in the action. 
B. Facts 
Middleton approved the annexation, zoning, and development of the West Highlands 
Project in 2006. (R. at 816.) Construction began that same year. Id. At that time, Middleton did 
not have an impact fee ordinance. Id. 
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In January 2009, Coleman Homes sent an application to Middleton requesting 
modifications to the Project. (R. at 310-11.) As part of Middleton's approval process for the 
Project, it required the Project to dedicate over fifteen acres of parks and open spaces, as well as 
transportation improvements, to Middleton, despite the lack of an impact fee ordinance at the 
time of approval. (R. at 130.) Middleton approved this application. (R. at 816.) Had an impact 
fee ordinance been in place at the time the Project was approved, Middleton would not have 
required the open space commitment, and the Project would simply have been required to be 
responsible for impact fees pursuant to the ordinance. (R. at 131.) 
In March 2009, Middleton still did not have an impact fee ordinance. (R. at 817.) The 
parties worked to find a solution for how future impact fees and credits for fees would be 
assessed on the ongoing Project. Id. Middleton, West Highlands, and Coleman Homes executed 
a Development Agreement, Revision #2 to address these issues, among others. (R. at 284-93.) 
Article IV of the Development Agreement addresses impact fees. (R. at 287-88.) Soon after, in 
June 2009, construction began on Phase 3 of the Project. (R. at 817.) 
In July 2009, Middleton passed an impact fee ordinance-Ordinance No. 447. Id. This 
impact fee ordinance imposed a park impact fee of an astounding $2,635.00 per lot. Id. In the 
two years after Middleton passed Ordinance No. 447, Coleman and Middleton negotiated a 
resolution to the issue of impact fees, given that there was no impact fee ordinance at the time of 
the Project's approval. Id. Thus, the parties negotiated a mechanism to deal with the impact fee 
credits owed to the Project, coupled with assurances that appropriate open space was publicly 
available. Id. 
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The Impact Fee Agreement ("IPA") and the Parks Dedication Agreement ("PDA''), 
executed on December 8 and 15, 2011, respectively, are the result of the negotiations regarding 
the payment of impact fees and the credit due to the Project by virtue of providing open space 
and transportation improvements. (R. at 817; R. at 135-55.) In the IPA, Middleton, West 
Highlands, and Coleman Homes agreed that no impact fees were due (under the service level of 
Ordinance No. 447) to Middleton because the Project was providing certain parks and 
transportation improvements. (R. at 135-48.) In the PDA, West Highlands HOA and Middleton 
agreed to identify 12.8 acres of park lands within the Project. (R. at 150-55.) That agreement 
also mandated a reduction in open space in the event an impact fee ordinance with a lower level 
of service was passed. Id. 
Around the time that the IF A and PDA were negotiated, Middleton was beginning to 
examine whether Ordinance No. 447 was legal. (R. at 177-80.) By 2012, that ordinance was 
repealed, and no new ordinance was passed until 2015. (R. at 817.) 
Ordinance No. 447 was revoked as a result of the findings of a committee put together by 
Middleton to examine the legality of the impact fee. (R. at 177.) Middleton assembled an Impact 
Fee Committee that issued findings and recommendations on June 6, 2012 regarding the legality 
of Ordinance No. 447. (R. at 177-80.) Those findings and recommendations included a finding 
that the "Middleton Impact Fee Ordinance is not compliant with Idaho State Code ... " and 
recommended refund of all impact fees collected under the repealed ordinance. (R. at 177.) In 
particular, the committee found that the repealed ordinance violated the Idaho Development 
Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA"). (R. at 177-80.) One identified violation was that the ordinance's 
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impact fee charge was simply too high-the committee found, via a study performed by Keller 
Associates, Inc., that "[t]he maximum justifiable park and pathway/trail impact fee that the City 
could assess to future residential development is $1,485 per residential unit (single family 
dwelling unit)." (R. at 214.) 
Due to these findings, Middleton repealed the ordinance, and in 2015, Middleton passed a 
new parks impact fee ordinance, Ordinance No. 541. (R. at 817.) The new impact fee is set at the 
maximum justifiable rate of $1,485.00 per lot, a substantial decrease from the prior level of 
service that was used to calculate open space in the IF A. (See id.) 
The instant dispute arose when Middleton passed its new Ordinance No. 541, which was 
at a much lower service level than Ordinance No. 447-the service level governing the IFA and 
PDA. (See, e.g., R. at 9-13.) Around the time of filing suit, Middleton began to act contrary to its 
asserted litigation position by collecting impact fees (which were not due under the IFA and 
PDA) while at the same time asserting that the IFA and PDA were enforceable agreements. (R. 
at 43.) 
C. Procedural History 
Middleton filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the Appellants on September 4, 
2015. (R. at 9.) The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the IFA and PDA are valid and 
enforceable agreements despite Middleton's repeal of Ordinance No. 447. (R. at 9-13.) The 
Appellants answered, denying the enforceability of the IFA and PDA. (R. at 35-39.) 
The Appellants, however, later moved to amend their answer to admit that the IF A and 
PDA were valid agreements, and to allege a counterclaim against Middleton. (R. at 41-64.) The 
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Appellants chose to move to amend their answer because Middleton was acting contrary to its 
asserted position in its complaint. (R. at 43.) Specifically, while seeking enforcement of the IFA 
and PDA (which prohibited collection of impact fees from the Project), Middleton was in 
actuality collecting fees from the Project. Id. Further, it became clear to the Appellants that the 
crux of the issue presented to the district court involved the interpretation of the IF A and PDA, 
rather than their enforceability, necessitating a counterclaim in that regard. Id. 
The proposed counterclaim included a request that the district court declare that the IF A 
and PDA prohibited the collection of any impact fees from the Project, and that any impact fees 
that Middleton collected were collected in violation of the IF A and PDA under a variety of legal 
theories. (R. at 57-62.) Once it was clear that Middleton faced a counterclaim due to the 
illegally-collected fees, Middleton offered to return them. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 9, L. 16-25, p. 10, L. 1-
25, p. 11, L. 1-22.) In its response to the Appellants' motion to amend their answer, Middleton 
stated, "Now that the Defendants concedes [sic] that they are valid the City will return the park 
impact fees collected upon this Court entering its Order that the Agreements are valid and 
binding between the parties." (R. at 74.) The Court allowed the Appellants to amend their 
answer, and entered an order finding that the IF A and the PDA are valid and enforceable, 
consistent with the parties' arguments at hearing on the Appellants' motion to amend. (R. at 87.) 
Middleton returned the impact fees in the amount of $23,760.00. (R. at 261.) 
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, requesting that the district court 
interpret the IFA and PDA. (R. at 112-484; 488-814.) The Appellants argued that the Project was 
responsible for 6.92 acres of public access space. (R. at 125-26.) Middleton argued that the 
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Project was responsible for 15.1 acres of public access space. (E.g., R. at 743.) Middleton's 
argument was based not on the IF A or PDA itself, but rather the Project's conditions of approval. 
(E.g., R. at 244.) 
The district court held in its October 17, 2016 Memorandum Decision and Order on the 
Parties' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment that neither party was correct-the PDA required 
that the Project dedicate 12.8 acres of public space. (R. at 820.) The district court also held that 
"Coleman must provide one or more financial guarantees if Coleman applies for building permits 
before completion of the equivalent service level of parks and streets." (R. at 823.) 
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration. (R. at 825-29; 833-61; 917-21.) 
Throughout this process, Middleton continued to argue that the Project must provide 15.1 acres. 
(R. at 826.) The district court denied both parties' motions for reconsideration. (R. at 943-45.) 
The court entered a judgment consistent with its Memorandum Decision on November 2, 
2016. (R. at 831.) Both sides filed petitions for attorney fees and costs. (R. at 862-916.) The 
Appellants moved to strike Middleton's petition for fees and costs as untimely filed and served. 
(R. at 922-24). They also moved to disallow Middleton's petition for fees and costs. (R. at 937-
42.) The Appellants provided evidence that Middleton's petition for fees and costs was not 
timely served. (R. at 954-57.) 
On February 8, 2017, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order 
Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs to the City of Middleton in the Amount of $28,526.22 (R. at 
958-65.) The district court found that Middleton was the prevailing party as follows: 
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(R. at 961.) 
Overall, Middleton prevailed in this action. The Court 
granted Middleton's request for declaratory relief by ordering that 
the IF A and the PDA are valid and enforceable. On the ultimate 
issue of open space acreage, the Court's 12.8-acre determination is 
much closer to Middleton's position than Coleman's (a 2.3-acre 
difference versus a 5.88-acre difference). Middleton also avoided 
liability on Coleman's breach of contract counterclaim. 
The court also entered an amended judgment reflecting the attorney fee amount. (R. at 
966-68.) The Appellants filed a motion to reconsider the attorney fee decision. (R. at 969-71; R. 
at 976-85.) 
The Appellants also filed a motion to alter or amend the amended judgment, on the basis 
that the judgment did not clarify the relief that is accorded against the various parties. (R. at 972-
75.) The court granted this motion (R. at 995-98) and entered a Second Amended Judgment 
consistent with this decision on April 10, 2017. (R. at 999-1001.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Attorney Fees in District Court Proceedings: Did the District Court abuse its discretion 
in declaring Middleton the prevailing party? 
Attorney Fees on Appeal: The Appellants seek costs and attorney fees on appeal as 
authorized by I.A.R. 40 and I.A.R. 41. They base their claim for fees on LC. § 12-120(3) and the 
parties' agreements as the prevailing party in a commercial transaction. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The determination of who is a prevailing party is committed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court." Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 368, 79 P.3d 723, 727 (2003); see also 
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Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B). To assess an abuse of discretion, this Court applies the three-factor 
test: "(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 
trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." Bream, at id. (citing Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 
Idaho 703, 52 P.3d 848 (2002)). 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B) sets forth the governing legal standards on the prevailing 
party issue. There are three factors the trial court must consider when determining which party, if 
any, prevailed: (1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; 
(2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which 
each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues. Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 192, 
191 P.3d 1107, 1112 (Ct. App. 2008). "In determining which party prevailed where there are 
claims and counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed 'in the 
action': that is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, 
not a claim-by-claim analysis." Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540, 
545,272 P.3d 512, 517 (2012). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Declaring Middleton the Prevailing Party. 
1. The district court erred by failing to consider Middleton's return of the 
illegally-collected impact fees in its prevailing party analysis. 
In a case with multiple claims between parties, the district court should consider in its 
prevailing party analysis: (1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; 
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(2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which 
each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B); Nguyen, 146 
Idaho at 192, 191 P.3d at 1112. 
Here, the district court simply failed to consider at all the result that Coleman Homes and 
West Highlands obtained by moving to amend their answer to bring a counterclaim against 
Middleton for $23,760.00 in illegally-collected fees in breach of the IF A. (See R. at 958-64.) 
Coleman Homes and West Highlands asserted the counterclaim as a result of Middleton's 
improper attempts to collect park impact fees, while simultaneously seeking enforcement of an 
agreement that prohibited Middleton from collecting the fees. (R. at 43.) When Coleman Homes 
and West Highlands threatened the counterclaim, Middleton quickly backed down and returned 
the sum of $23,760.00 in improperly collected impact fees. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 9, L. 16-25, p. 10, L. 
1-25, p. 11, L. 1-22; R. at 74; R. at 261.) 
Coleman Homes and West Highlands prevailed against Middleton on this issue. Coleman 
Homes and West Highlands recovered the illegally-collected fees against Middleton. The only 
relief that Middleton received against these parties is a potential requirement that West 
Highlands provide certain financial guarantees under the IFA. (R. at 1000.) For Coleman 
Homes, no relief was obtained against it, but it obtained relief against Middleton. The district 
court abused its discretion by failing to even consider that Coleman Homes and West Highlands 
obtained the result of the return of the impact fees, by failing to appreciate that Middleton 
obtained no relief against Coleman Homes, and by failing to consider that Middleton's relief 
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against West Highlands was minimal compared to the result that West Highlands obtained 
against Middleton. 
2. The district court erred in considering the validity and enforceability of the 
IFA and PDA in its prevailing party analysis. 
In determining that Middleton was the prevailing party, the Court relied upon the notion 
that "the Court granted Middleton's request for declaratory relief by ordering that the IFA and 
PDA are valid and enforceable." (R. at 961.) The presentation of this fact in the Court's order 
creates the illusion that the issue of enforceability was litigated as part of the summary judgment 
proceedings. However, once the Mayor's true goals were revealed and it was discovered that 
Middleton was surreptitiously collecting impact fees, the Appellants moved to amend their 
answer and assert a counterclaim. (R. at 43.) Therein, the Appellants admitted that the Impact 
Fee Agreement and Parks Dedication Agreement were enforceable. (R. at 89-94.) Middleton 
actually objected to the Appellants' motion to amend their answer. (R. at 66-74.) To be clear, 
the Court did not rule that the agreements were valid and enforceable during the course of this 
litigation-it was admitted by Appellants early in the case and before summary judgment 
proceedings. The vast majority of fees expended occurred long after this occurred. Thus, it was 
error for the district court to utilize the validity of the agreement in the prevailing party analysis. 
3. In its prevailing party analysis, the district court failed to acknowledge that 
four separate entities are defendant-appellants in this lawsuit. 
The district court's prevailing party analysis was in error, because it ignored the separate 
corporate identities of the four Appellants. (See R. at 958-64.) It is an abuse of discretion for a 
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district court to fail to distinguish among parties involved and not involved in a commercial 
transaction for the purposes of an attorney fee award. 
In Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 21, 105 P.3d 676, 681 (2005), the 
plaintiff leased Murphy's Lounge from the owner, Mountain West Ventures, LLC and her liquor 
license from Murphy's Lounge, LLC. The plaintiff sued her lessors, as well as the individual 
owners of the entities, over a dispute regarding her lease; the plaintiff prevailed in the action and 
was awarded attorney fees against all defendants under LC. § 12-120(3). 141 Idaho at 32, 105 
P.3d at 692. But since her commercial transaction (the leases) only involved the business entities 
that were signatories, it was reversible error for the district court to award fees against the 
individual owners. Id. This Court therefore reversed the district court's award of attorney fees 
against the individuals. Id. ("Only Mountain West and Murphy's Lounge engaged in the 
commercial transaction with Gunter, however. Therefore the award of attorney fees should only 
be against those two Defendants."); see also Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & 
Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-20, 117 P.3d 130, 132-34 (2005). 
Here, the district court erred in failing to distinguish among the various corporate entities 
involved in this suit. 
(a) No relief was granted against WH Land or Coleman Homes; this 
Court should reverse the district court's finding that Middleton was 
the prevailing party. 
WH Land was not a signatory to either the Impact Fee Agreement or the Parks 
Dedication Agreement. (R. at 135-55.) Thus, the district court did not grant any relief against 
this party, and WH Land was not party to the commercial transaction upon which the district 
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court based its award for attorney fees and costs. The district court therefore abused its discretion 
by assessing fees and costs against WH Land, and by failing to consider that WH Land avoided 
liability in the lawsuit. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 
716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005) ("Avoiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant. In 
baseball, it is said that a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In 
litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a 
plaintiff.") 
Similarly, although Coleman Homes was a signatory to the IF A, the district court 
awarded no relief against it. Coleman Homes is not a signatory to the PD A-the document that 
the district court found required West Highlands HOA to keep open 12.8 acres of park space. (R. 
at 820.) The only part of the judgment relevant to Coleman Homes is the declaration that the 
Impact Fee Agreement is valid and enforceable-Coleman Homes acknowledged that long 
before substantive motion practice on any issue. (See Section A2, supra.) And, as explained 
above, the district court failed to consider that Coleman Homes obtained relief against Middleton 
related to the illegally-collected fees. (See Section Al, supra.) Therefore, the district court 
abused its discretion by assessing fees and costs against Coleman Homes. 
Since WH Land and Coleman Homes had no relief accorded against them, and since 
Coleman Homes prevailed against Middleton, this Court should reverse the district court's 
prevailing party determination and hold that these parties prevailed in the action. 
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(b) The only relief granted against West Highlands is the requirement of 
potential financial guarantees. 
The only relief that Middleton received against West Highlands is a potential requirement 
that it provide certain financial guarantees under the IF A but made no determination that such a 
financial guarantee was actually necessary. (R. at 1000.) The district court abused its discretion 
by failing to even consider that West Highlands obtained the result of the return of the impact 
fees, and by failing to consider that Middleton's relief against West Highlands was minimal 
compared to the result that West Highlands obtained against Middleton. (See Section Al, supra.) 
Since West Highlands had de minimis relief accorded against it, and since it prevailed against 
Middleton, this Court should reverse the district court's prevailing party determination and hold 
that West Highlands prevailed in the action. 
(c) The only relief granted against West Highlands HOA was the open 
space acreage requirement. 
In its prevailing party analysis, the district court relied on the determination that 12.8 
acres of open space must be submitted as a result of the Parks Dedications Agreement. (See R. at 
958-64.) That open space requirement is enforceable only against the signatory to the PDA. The 
only defendant that is a signatory to that agreement is West Highlands HOA. 
4. Middleton is not the prevailing party. 
Middleton did not avoid liability in this suit, because West Highlands and Coleman 
Homes recovered all illegally-collected impact fees from Middleton. (See Section Al, supra.) 
Additionally, Middleton did not prevail on the enforceability of the Impact Fee Agreement or the 
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Parks Dedication Agreement because the amended answer disposed of that issue early in the case 
and it was not adjudicated in the summary judgment decision. (See Section Al, supra.) 
No or minimal relief has been granted against Coleman Homes, WH Land, and West 
Highlands. (See R. at 1000.) The only entity appreciably implicated in the district court's 
summary judgment decision is the HOA which is required to submit 12.8 acres of open space via 
the Parks Dedication Agreement. Id. Middleton, however, sought to increase that number to 
15.1 utilizing an incorrect reading of the applicable agreements. (E.g., R. at 743.) Where the 
single position taken by the plaintiff in the lawsuit-that is, seeking 15 .1 acres of open space-is 
denied by the district court, there is no basis to conclude that Middleton is the prevailing party. 
To be sure, Middleton prosecuted a lawsuit seeking to obtain far more open space than it was 
entitled to. The district court denied that undertaking. With the addition of the fact that three of 
the four Defendants are not subject to significant relief in favor of Middleton, this position is 
bolstered. The district court erred in finding that Middleton was the overall prevailing party in 
the action. 
5. Appellants were the prevailing parties.1 
The foregoing argument establishes that Appellants are the prevailing parties. At the 
very least, three of the four Appellants prevailed in this lawsuit. Coleman Homes and West 
Highlands successfully recovered illegally collected impact fees. No relief was granted against 
Coleman Homes. No relief was granted against WH Land and it was not even a signatory to 
1 For the Court's ease of reference, the Appellants provide Appendix A as an illustrative 
exhibit showing the relief accorded to and against each Appellant. 
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either the IFA or the PDA. West Highlands was determined to be responsible for a guarantee but 
no decision was made mandating any action on the part of West Highlands. The only entity that 
was truly involved in the relief granted within this litigation on the side of the Appellants is West 
Highlands HOA. That entity litigated whether 12.8 acres of open space should be decreased by 
operation of the IF A and successfully defended a baseless allegation by the City of Middleton 
that the amount of open space should be increased. On this issue, neither Middleton nor West 
Highlands HOA prevailed. 
B. Middleton's Memorandum of Fees and Costs Was Not Timely Filed or Served. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(4) requires that a memorandum of costs and fees be "filed and 
served" on the adverse party "not later than 14 days after entry of judgment." Id. 
1. Middleton's fee petition was not timely filed. 
The district court ruled that the judgment was entered on November 7, 2017 and therefore 
a filing date of November 17, 2016 was timely pursuant to the rule. (R. at 1012-13.) In 
supporting this decision, the Court relied upon Idaho R. Civ. P. 58 and the Idaho Supreme Court 
decision Stibal v. Fano, 157 Idaho 428, 337 P.3d 587 (2014). 
To begin, the original judgment in this case plainly stated "ENTERED this 2 day of 
November, 2016." (R. at 1009.) The stamp by the clerk indicates that it was filed on November 
7, 2016. (R. at 1008.) 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 58 states that the "filing of a judgment by the court as provided in Rule 
5(d)" OR "the placing of the clerk's filing stamp on the judgment" consists of the clerk's entry of 
judgment. Id. In its order, the district court only considered the second aspect of Rule 58 
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regarding the placing of the clerk's stamp. (R. at 1013.) However, Idaho R. Civ. P. 5(d) states 
that entry is accomplished when a "judge who agrees to accept it for filing, and who must then 
note the filing date on the paper and promptly send it to the clerk." Id. Pursuant to the 
combination of Rule 58 and Rule 5(d), the district court's notation of the entry as November 2 is 
binding and the memorandum of costs was not timely. 
The district court's citation to the Stibal decision presents an altogether different factual 
scenario based on a completely different rule. In Stibal, the Idaho Supreme Court was presented 
with the issue of whether a notice of appeal was timely pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 14( a) 
which triggers a deadline "within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the 
clerk of the court on any judgment or order of the district court .... " 157 Idaho at 433,337 P.3d 
at 592. The first aspect of Rule 5 8 cited above, referencing Rule 5( d) is not in the appellate rule 
deadline. Therefore, that case is not applicable. 
2. The only evidence presented to the district court regarding the service of the 
Plaintiff's Fee Petition was the Supplemental Affidavit of Bradley J. Dixon in 
Support of Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Petition for Fees and Costs. 
The district court's order ruled that a factual dispute existed between the parties regarding 
the service of the fee petition. Defendants presented the Supplemental Affidavit of Bradley J. 
Dixon in Support of Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Petition for Fees and Costs outlining the fax 
receipt and logging procedures at Givens Pursley, LLP as well as detailing the efforts to obtain a 
copy of the un-served petition. (R. at 954-56.) Middleton provided no rebuttal, was careful at 
argument not to represent that the documents were definitively served, and noted only that a 
certificate of service was attached to the documents alleging service on November 17, 2016. (Tr. 
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Vol. I, p. 44, L. 11-19.) Citing to Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593, 990 P.2d 1204 
(1999), the Court concluded that this was a factual dispute and ruled that the service had been 
timely completed in the absence of any affirmative evidence or even allegation that it had been 
served correctly. 
The Allstate decision reveals a completely opposite set of circumstances applying an 
analysis in the opposite direction from the court here. There, Allstate alleged that Mocaby had 
failed to timely obiect to its petition for fees and costs. 133 Idaho at 599-600, 990 P.2d at 1210-
1211. Based on a handwritten note on the top of its memorandum of costs, as well as a certificate 
of service, Allstate argued that it filed on July 11 and Mocaby's July 30 objection was untimely. 
Id. However, the memorandum also bore facsimile dating on the top of each page noting a 
July 15 date. Id. Because the Idaho Supreme Court was unable to definitively determine when 
Allstate filed its petition, it concluded that the Mocaby objection was timely. Id. In sum, the 
Idaho Supreme Court gave the benefit of the doubt to the objecting party, not the filing party, 
when no evidence was available to determine the filing date. 
Here, the district court was presented with evidence that the certificate of service was 
incorrect and, indeed false. Middleton did not present a single bit of corroborating evidence to 
support the November 17 service date and was careful in its representations to the Court. 
Nonetheless, despite Appellants having their time to respond drastically decreased and despite no 
evidence from Middleton that the November 17 date was actually correct, the district court gave 
the offending party the benefit of the doubt and resolved what it describes as a factual dispute 
when no facts were presented corroborating the November 17 service date. Taking the district 
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court's logic to the necessary conclusion, had the Appellants objected fourteen days from the 
date they were actually served with the fee petition, the district court, using the unsupported 
November 17 service date, would apparently conclude that Appellants' objection was untimely. 
That reasoning creates a result directly contrary to the very Supreme Court decision cited. 
The Allstate decision first requires an actual factual dispute and second requires that the 
benefit of the doubt should go to the non-offending party. Allstate also refused to exclusively 
rely on the certificate of service. Here, the only actual evidence regarding service is the 
supplemental affidavit served by the Appellants. Nothing in the record creates a factual dispute. 
It is noteworthy that Middleton never responded to that affidavit. To be consistent with Allstate, 
this Court should conclude that service was untimely. 
C. The Appellants Should be Awarded Their Fees and Costs on Appeal 
The Appellants request and are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to 
I.A.R. 40 and 41 and under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and the operative agreements as the 
prevailing party on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellants respectfully request this Court vacate and 
remand the judgment of the district court and award them their attorney fees and costs in 
bringing this appeal. 
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DATED: October 2, 2017. 
,I 
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GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
radley J -~»---:.--...... __. 
Kersti H. Kennedy 
Attorneys for Coleman Homes, LLC, an Ida 'lO . l 
company, and WEST HIGHLANDS, LLC, an Idaho limited /iabi z y 
company, WEST HIGHLANDS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho Corporation; WEST HIGHLANDS 
LAND DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company 
APPENDIX A 
Party Signatory to These Relief Obtained Relief Awarded 
Agreements Against Middleton Against Party 
West Highlands Land None None None 
Coleman Homes, IFA Return of impact fees None, other than 
LLC collected in violation of declaration that IF A is 
the IF A in the amount enforceable 
of $23,760.00 
West Highlands, LLC IFA Return of impact fees Declaration that IF A 
collected in violation of is enforceable 
the IF A in the amount 
of $23,760.00 Contingent obligation 
to provide financial 
guarantees 
West Highlands HOA PDA None Requirement of 12.8 
acres open space, an 
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